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Abstract 
 
This report summarizes the characteristics of migration in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) after its reforms and opening up. Rapid urbanization in the PRC has resulted from 
recent decades of intense rural–urban migration. The scale of migration increased rapidly 
and long-term migration is the main characteristic. The population characteristics of 
migration are determined not only by a personal decision, but also a joint decision within 
households to send members with comparative advantages in manufacturing and services, 
usually male and young, to work in cities. Coastal regions where manufacturing and services 
are better developed, especially big cities, are the major destinations. The aspiration for 
higher-income and better job opportunities is the major force that drives migration, while 
public services and urban amenities also partly account for population flows. However, in the 
PRC, there are still major institutional barriers—especially the hukou system and related 
segmentation in the urban labor market, social security, and public services access—that 
hinder rural–urban and interregional migration. Facing the challenges of fast urbanization 
and growing urban diseases, local governments still rely on the current system to control the 
population flow into large cities. Controlling population growth by discriminative policies will 
lead to more social problems. Policy makers should reconsider the way to achieve efficient 
and harmonious urbanization by shifting to more pro-market policies and reducing the 
migration costs embedded in institutional constraints. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been experiencing rapid urbanization for 
the past few decades. Its urban population accounted for only 20.91% of its total 
population in 1982, but this increased to 52.6% in 2012.1 According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (2013), 236 million people live in a place where they do 
not have a local hukou,2 and the majority of these people are rural–urban migrants. 
Whether urban economic growth creates jobs for migrants and allows them to become 
permanent residents in cities depends on various institutional constraints. Labor 
migration in the PRC, like anywhere else in the world, is the result of rational decision 
making by individuals or households after weighing costs and benefits. Comprehending 
this decision making is the key to understanding the phenomenon of migration.  
This working paper begins with an examination of the institutions related to rural–urban 
migration. Personal, household, and destination characteristics of migration are then 
summarized; the third section analyzes the relationship between urbanization and 
migrant employment. The findings of studies on segmentation and integration in urban 
societies are then noted. 
2. INSTITUTIONS 
Before its reforms and opening up, the PRC adopted a “scissors-gap” system that 
depressed the relative price of agricultural goods and boosted the relative price of 
industrial goods to achieve capital accumulation in the industrial sector as well as rapid 
industrialization. At the same time, the wages of the urban industrial sector were 
artificially suppressed to increase the profit potential and capital accumulation of the 
industrial sector. Cities had various welfare programs, such as state-sponsored 
pensions, health care, education, and housing programs.  
At this time, the real income of urban residents was much higher than that of rural 
residents, which created a huge incentive for rural residents to migrate to cities. 
However, the urban industrial sector’s tilt toward heavy industry meant that its  
job-creation ability was low. Since achieving full employment for urban residents was 
already difficult, the government also rigorously restricted rural residents from migrating 
to cities through the hukou system and even attempted to alleviate urban employment 
pressure through the Shang Shan Xia Siang (literally, “go to the mountains and 
countryside”) movement.  
After the reforms and opening up, the economy began to participate in the globalization 
process. The comparative advantage of relatively high-quality and low-cost labor 
enabled the PRC to enter the labor-intensive link of the global supply chain, especially 
export-processing manufacturing. Since situating export-processing manufacturing 
near the eastern and southern coastal regions saved transport costs, much foreign 
capital was and is concentrated in the coastal provinces. Today, most newly created 
jobs in manufacturing are in these coastal provinces, causing labor to migrate from 
rural areas to cities, while also migrating from the inland to the coastal regions  
1 The 2011 population census (NBSC 2012) and 2012 population census (NBSC 2013) were used to 
estimate the urbanization ratio in 1982. 
2  Hukou is a registration identity determined according to one’s parents’ hukou, which is usually based on 
where one’s parents originated. Hukou is linked to locally financed social security and public services, 
and often results in discrimination against migrants, as only a few can change their hukou status. It is 
especially difficult to change hukou in large cities such as Beijing, Ghangzhou, and Shanghai.  
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(Duan et al. 2008). Rural–urban and interregional migration provide a lot of labor  
for manufacturing, help propel economic growth, and are conducive to narrowing  
urban–rural income gaps. 
In the 1980s, labor migration was strictly constrained by the hukou system.3 At that 
time, since the economy was still in a state of shortage, urban residents purchased 
grain with liangpiao (grain coupons). If rural residents managed to enter a city to find 
work, they had to bring their own food or obtain liangpiao in the city, which made the 
costs of labor migration very high.  
On 1 April 1993, the state increased the purchase and sale prices of grain, while on  
10 May, the control over prices of grain and cooking oil were relaxed in Beijing, and 
liangpiao ceased to exist. In fact, Guangdong had already made a stable transition 
after relaxing grain price controls 1 year earlier. Because liang you guanxi (grain and oil 
rationing registration) was no longer a restraint on labor mobility, the scale of labor 
migration grew rapidly.  
Based on various population censuses over the years, using persons separated from 
their hukou location as a criteria,4 Duan et al. (2008) estimated the migrant population 
to be 6.57 million in 1982, 18.10 million in 1987, 21.35 million in 1990, 70.73 million in 
1995, 102.29 million in 2000, and 147.35 million in 2005; the most evident acceleration 
occurred during 1990 and 1995. 
Sun (2004) found that migrant workers have made great contributions to the economic 
development of coastal regions. The gross domestic product (GDP) created by migrant 
workers is equivalent to 32.0% of Beijing’s economic aggregate, 31.0% of Shanghai’s, 
30.0% of Guangdong’s, 11.0% of Jiangsu’s, 17.0% of Zhejiang’s, and 16.8% of 
Fujian’s. Migrant workers also created one-sixth to one-third of the social wealth in 
these provinces.  
Li (1999) was among the first to use data from sample surveys to study the income 
growth effect and income distribution effect of labor migration. He pointed out that rural 
labor migration to cities has a positive impact on income growth and income distribution 
within the countryside, and can play a positive role in restraining increases in  
urban–rural, interregional, and even intra-countryside income gaps—something that is 
not possible for general income redistribution policies to achieve. Correcting unequal 
income distribution that emerges during economic development through rural labor 
migration is undoubtedly an effective rational choice that meets the requirements of 
marketization. Besides, such a choice is not only harmonious with the goal of market-
oriented economic reforms but also consistent with the strategic goal of urban–rural 
economic integration. 
However, migrant workers are believed to have caused a shock to the urban labor 
market in the 1990s. During the mid- to late 1990s, large numbers of migrant workers 
flooded the cities, and labor market reforms in cities rapidly progressed, with many 
3  Refer to Chan and Zhang (1999) for an introduction to and critique of the hukou system. 
4  The definitions of the migrant population have slightly differed in each census, but are largely 
comparable. In the fifth population census, the migrant population referred to people with two types of 
hukou registration situations (i.e., survey item R6): “have resided over half a year in a specific 
neighborhood, but hukou is in another area’s neighborhood” and “have resided less than half a year in a 
specific neighborhood, and been away from their hukou registration area for over half a year”, while 
eliminating people who lived in a place different from their registered residence within a city. According 
to the 1% sample survey project conducted in 2005, the migrant population referred to a population 
whose “residence at time of survey” (i.e., survey item R7) is in a specific area, but their “hukou 
registration residence” is beyond that neighborhood, while also eliminating people who live in a place 
different from their registered residence within a city. See Duan et al. (2008). 
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enterprises laying off redundant employees. This action led many to believe that 
migrant workers took away jobs from urban residents. But this squeezing effect has not 
been supported by empirical studies; if migrant workers have any impact, it is mainly on 
urban wages. Li (unpublished) showed that rural labor migration’s negative impact on 
the urban economy is infinitesimal, and its employment substitution effect is only 
around 0.1. In the long run, such migration depresses the trend of urban employee 
wages rising too fast.  
Li (1997) also provided a theoretical model and policy simulation analysis, showing that 
the entry of rural labor increases the income gap between skilled and nonskilled labor 
within cities, which is a correction of the traditional wage administration apparatus.  
Liu and Zhao (2009) employed 1% population census data from 2005 and discovered 
that the impact of migrant workers on urban wages is larger than their impact on  
the employment rate, which means that there is a limited reaction of urban labor to 
migrant labor, mainly reflected in a reduction of reservation wages, not in the loss of  
job opportunities. 
Although the impact of migrant labor on urban employment is exaggerated, labor 
market segmentation policies according to hukou are still formulated and implemented 
in cities. Hukou-based identity discrimination still exists, and the difficulty of obtaining 
an urban hukou varies across different regions. Wu, Zhang, and Chen (2010) 
constructed the Hukou Settlement Threshold Index with four directly administered 
municipalities, 27 provincial capitals, and 15 cities of other levels, and found that cities 
with high index readings are mainly situated in the eastern coastal regions, while the 
cities with low index readings are mainly concentrated in the central regions. One view 
is that the PRC’s current labor mobility is very free, with interregional labor mobility 
being especially uninhibited. In fact, without local urban hukous, migrant workers face 
at least “three discriminations and one barrier” in cities, which increases the costs of 
labor migration, thereby restricting labor mobility and urbanization. Specifically, the 
“three discriminations” include: employment, social security, and public services. 
2.1 Employment 
At the early stage of the post-reform era, city governments attempted to restrain firms 
from recruiting migrant labor, usually by levying extra fees on firms that recruited 
migrant labor, while also limiting migrant labor entrance to a few specific industries. 
Today, although most discriminatory policies have been rescinded, it is almost 
impossible for those without local urban hukous to enter the civil services and  
high-income monopolistic industries. By employing China Health and Nutrition Survey 
data for 2006, it can be observed that good jobs are almost all occupied by labor with 
urban hukous, and even in an inferior labor market, labor with local urban hukous are 
at an advantageous position (Qiao, Qian, and Yao 2009).  
Yao and Lai (2004) analyzed data from surveys of Zhejiang firms and rural labor,  
and discovered that hukou discrimination can explain 20%–30% of the difference in 
labor and capital relations between urban and rural workers. Other than labor 
contracts, migrant workers face hukou discrimination in wages, pension, health care, 
unemployment insurance, and trade union participation.  
Démurger et al. (2009) employed nationwide sample data from 2002 to find that in 
cities, the annual wage of local residents is 1.3 times that of the long-term rural migrant 
workers. Further decomposition of this differential showed that the migrant population 
has a comparative advantage in the private sector, while entering the public sector 
does not increase their average wages, and vice versa for local residents. The 
population factor itself is very important, which is reflected in the fact that the wage 
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differentials between the two groups mainly come from differences before entrance into 
the labor market (e.g., education opportunities), but not from the market itself.  
Further, Zhou and He (2009) found that the attraction of urban regions to rural migrant 
labor is closely related to the ownership structure of the urban economy. After the 
1990s, rural labor that migrated to the cities tended to work outside of the traditional 
system, and few could squeeze into state-owned enterprises. 
The hukou system’s discrimination is not only reflected in wages but also in job 
opportunities. Based on survey data on Beijing, Wuxi, and Zhuhai, Zhang (2010) 
discovered that hukou-based discrimination reduces job opportunities for the migrant 
population and increases the costs that they bear while job hunting and unemployed. 
Therefore, although short-term migrants may mainly work in jobs that locals are 
unwilling to do, they change jobs less often and only when they have stayed in the city 
for a while and have accumulated enough assets.5 
2.2 Social Security  
The PRC’s current social security system operates independently on local fiscal 
support; thus, each city’s system mainly serves its local residents. Even if some cities 
have social security provided especially for nonlocals, the level of security provided is 
low, and participation by migrant labor is not high. 6  Although the government is 
endeavoring to make personal endowment insurance accounts transferrable across 
regions, this has still not been achieved.  
For a long period, the general provision was that a nonlocal worker must pay social 
security contributions for 15 years continuously in the location where he or she works 
to collect pension insurance in the same place. Since 1 July 2014, a new rule has 
come into place, whereby workers are allowed to contribute to the pension system and 
accumulate their personal accounts in different cities. 
2.3 Public Services  
Some public services provided by the local government are not and inherently cannot 
be discriminatory, such as greenery and public transport. However, some public 
services are linked to hukou, among which children’s education is especially important. 
Without a local urban hukou, migrants cannot send their children to a public 
kindergarten at the rate charged to local residents. Especially in large cities, local 
public schools do not admit children of migrant workers, and even if they did, the fee is 
higher, which led to many schools opening especially for migrant children. Since these 
schools have limited funds, the educational quality provided is poor.  
Recently, however, compulsory education schools have opened up to migrant children, 
but the schools do not offer them equal treatment. Moreover, cities where higher 
education resources are concentrated often tend to allocate a much larger university 
admittance quota to local students. The children of migrant workers must return to their 
original hukou location and participate in higher education entrance examinations 
there, making them face severe competition, which creates unequal opportunities in 
5  Li (1999) discovered that the first occupational change achieves a large augmentation in occupational 
status, whereas the second occupational change is horizontal and status augmentation is not attained, 
mainly due to the lack of status accumulation, status inheritance, and social resources. 
6  Zhang, Gao, and Hou (2007) found that urban–rural segmentation factors and regional segmentation 
systems form a negative impact on the nonlocal urban population’s participation in social security. 
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higher education, blocking intergenerational income and social mobility. 7  A related 
result is that high school education in cities (especially large cities) is in reality not 
equally accessible to the nonlocal population.8 
Rural–urban and interregional labor mobility also face barriers from the land system. To 
guarantee food security, a certain amount of farmland must be maintained; thus, a  
construction-use land quota-rationing system was implemented with a total quota for 
construction-use land development every year that could not be exceeded. Although 
the allocation of this quota must consider the different economic development needs of 
every region, an approach that is inclined toward egalitarianism exists. Coastal regions 
that need construction-use land more do not have enough quotas, whereas inland 
regions have land quotas but cannot make sufficient use of them, which results in low 
land-use efficiency. If a market-exchange mechanism existed in which regions with 
higher demands for land quotas could buy them from regions with relatively abundant 
land quotas, then more farmland could be converted into construction-use land. 
Regions that sold construction-use land quotas could relatively increase the reserves of 
agriculture-use land. Yet this cross-provincial balance between occupation and 
compensation of agriculture-use land is prohibited.  
Moreover, rural residents who enter a city often have their own rural residential  
land, which corresponds to the construction-use land quotas by demolishing their 
housing. Rural residents who enter a city are still prohibited from transferring the 
construction-use land quotas corresponding to their rural residential land at home. In 
other words, the rural residential land-use rights that rural residents have at home 
cannot be traded as assets. 
The aforementioned institutional constraints increase the costs of labor migration and 
create barriers for the integration of migrant workers into cities. The new generation  
of migrant workers seems to have stronger aspirations than the previous one of 
becoming urbanized; therefore, the barriers placed by institutional constraints on their 
integration into cities is even more significant (Liu and Cheng 2008). 
3. PROFILE OF MIGRATION IN THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
3.1 Scale and Trend  
After the reforms and opening up, the scale and share of migrants in the total 
population increased rapidly, especially after the 1990s. The scale of migrants grew 
from 6.57 million in 1982 to 221.40 million in 2010—almost 33 times. The PRC’s total 
population only increased 0.3 times during this period. The migrant share of the total 
population has also risen dramatically, from 0.65% in 1982 to 16.53% in 2010.  
7  There is no unanimous opinion on whether higher education is a public service. Recent research 
showed that higher education has strong externalities, so government input in higher education has 
certain public service properties. 
8  For an early critique on the social segmentation between populations with different hukous within cities, 
see Wang and Zuo (1999). Cai, Du, and Wang (2001) also studied the hukou system and labor market 
protection. Regarding the living standards of migrant workers, Sheng (2008) summarized the condition 
of migrant workers into seven aspects: low compensation, few benefits, poor residential conditions, lack 
of social security, difficulty in obtaining children’s education, heavy urban discrimination, and lack of a 
spiritual life.  
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Figure 1: Number and Share of Migrants in the People’s Republic of China,  
1982–2010 
 
Sources: Data on migrants 1982–2005 are from Duan et al. (2008); data on migrants in 2010 are from NBSC (2011); 
and data on total population are from NBSC (1983), NBSC (1988), NBSC (1991a), NBSC (1991b), NBSC (1995), NBSC 
(2006), and NBSC (2011).  
3.2 Population Structure of Migrants 
3.2.1 Sex Ratio  
The sex ratio of migrants fluctuated from 1982 to 2010. Before 1990, female migrants 
formed the main proportion of migrants due to social reasons such as marriage, 
moving with others, and joining relatives and friends (Duan et al. 2008). This kind of 
sex distribution changed fundamentally during the 1990s when the sex ratio became 
125, which meant that male migrants comprised the largest share of migrants. This 
change occurred because nonagricultural industries demanded a large number of  
male workers.  
Figure 2: Sex Ratio of Migrants, 1982–2010 
 
Note: The sex ratio refers to the male–female ratio. 
Sources: Data from 1982 to 2005 are from Duan et al. (2008) and 2010 data are from Duan, Yuan, and Guo (2013). 
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In the 21st century, the sex ratio fell to 107 in 2000 and then to 101 in 2005. The 
number of female migrants increased rapidly for two main reasons. First, the labor 
demand of nonagricultural industries had increased continuously, especially in 
services. Second, many female migrants left home to reunite with their husbands.  
In 2010, the sex ratio rose again. The reason for this could be that some female 
migrant workers went back home because of the 2008 global financial crisis or that the 
construction industry needed more male workers after the government launched a 
stimulus package. 
3.2.2 Age 
The average age of migrants increased from 28.22 years in 1982 to 30.08 years in 
2010, although with little decrease during 1987 to 1990 (Figure 3). This is relative to the 
declining fertility rate, the result of the one-child family-planning policy implemented in 
the 1980s.  
With the increasing age of migrants, many were worried that young migrants will 
become fewer, and that the supply of labor will be insufficient. However, the population 
share of labor aged 15–64 years among migrants rose from 57.89% in 1982 to 85.53% 
in 2010 (Duan, Yuan, and Guo 2013). As such, the working-age population is still the 
main component of migrants, and the number of working-age migrants is increasing. 
However, if the low fertility rate is maintained in the future, the working-age population 
will eventually fall.  
Figure 3: Average Age of Migrants, 1982–2010 
(years) 
 
Source: Duan, Yuan, and Gao (2013). 
3.2.3 Education 
The average education level of migrants has improved gradually, and has moved  
from the compulsory education stage (<9 years) into the senior middle school stage. 
The average education years attained increased by 4.34 years between 1982 and  
2010 (Figure 4). The average number of education years for migrants in 2010 was 
9.92 years, which is higher than the 8.85 years of the total population and the 7.75 
years of the rural population. 9  This indicates that migrants can be regarded as 
“educated elites” in rural areas, and that human capital as a driving force of the PRC’s 
migration has improved greatly.  
9  The average education years of the total population was calculated from data in NBSC (2011).  
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Figure 4: Average Education Years of Migrants Aged Above 6 Years, 1982–2010 
 
Source: Duan, Yuan, and Guo (2013). 
The ratio of migrants with higher education has also increased, while the ratio of 
migrants with low education has fallen. The ratio of high school graduates to total 
migrants increased from 8.41% in 1982 to 20.63% in 2010. The ratio of college 
graduates to total migrants increased from 1.04% in 1982 to 15.37% in 2010.  
According to the PRC’s hukou policy in previous years, when one went to college, he 
or she could obtain a nonagricultural hukou, and when he or she graduated, he or she 
would usually be assigned a job in a city. The graduate then obtained hukou in that city 
and would not be counted as a migrant in the census. For this reason, before 1990, 
there were almost no college graduates among migrants. However, after 1990, college 
graduates could no longer obtain assigned jobs. At the same time, more college 
graduates agglomerated to cities, especially big ones, and many could not get hukou in 
those cities, and thus were counted as migrants.  
Table 1 shows that migrants with college educations prefer intraprovincial migration to 
interprovincial migration. 
Table 1: Proportion of Interprovincial and Intraprovincial Migrants, 2010 
(%) 
 Intraprovicincial Interprovincial 
Total population 66.94 33.06 
No schooling 74.08 25.92 
Primary school 65.02 34.98 
Junior high school 57.37 42.63 
Senior high school 75.55 24.45 
College 79.79 20.21 
Bachelor 77.86 22.14 
Postgraduate 75.19 24.81 
Source: Ma and Chen (2012). 
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3.3 Long- or Short-Term Migration 
Figure 5 shows that the ratio of migrants that has worked outside of their hometowns 
for 5 years or more fell between 1982 and 2010, but increased from 7.0 million in 1982 
to 68.2 million in 2010—almost 9 times. The reason for the ratio falling is that there are 
more migrants every year who are regarded as short term (i.e., less than 5 years 
outside of their hometowns). Gradually, these new migrants will become long term  
(i.e., more than 5 years outside of their hometowns).  
Figure 5: Scale and Share of Migrants Working Outside of Their Hometowns  
for More than 5 Years, 1982–2010  
 
Source: Duan, Yuan, and Guo (2013). 
3.4 Migration with Families 
According to the monitoring survey on national rural–urban migrant workers by NBSC 
(2015), the ratio of rural-urban migrants with families outside their town remained 
steady at around 20% from 2008 to 2014, and migrants like “migrant birds” leaving 
families behind are still the most common. There are 61 million “left-behind” children, 
who do not live with their parents, but stay in their rural hometowns to  
study (National Women’s Federation Research Group 2013). Duan and Yang (2009) 
estimated there were 10.85 million left-behind married women according to the fifth 
population census in 2000, of which women aged 20–49 years accounted for 82.11%.  
Apart from left-behind children and women, there is another large group that is left 
behind—the elderly. They often stay in rural areas because they need to take care of 
their grandchildren who have been left behind by their parents or because they have 
lost the ability to work in urban areas. In 2012, there were 50 million left-behind elderly, 
leading to serious concerns about disease and disability problems (Wu 2013).  
3.5 Flow of Migration 
3.5.1 Origins  
Table 2 shows that migrant workers who migrate outside of their hometowns mainly 
come from the middle and western regions. Migrant workers who were engaged in 
nonagricultural activities in their hometowns mostly come from the eastern region.  
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Table 2: Origins of Rural–Urban Workers, 2008–2012 
(%) 
Region 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Outside Local Outside Local Outside Local Outside Local Outside Local 
Eastern 30.8 63.6 31.9 63.7 31.8 62.9 31.6 61.4 31.5 60.8 
Middle  37.0 22.3 36.5 21.9 36.6 22.5 36.6 22.7 36.7 22.9 
Western 32.2 14.1 31.6 14.4 31.6 14.6 31.8 15.9 31.8 16.3 
Note: Outside migrant workers refer to those who migrate outside of their hometowns for more than 6 months. Local 
migrant workers refer to those who were engaged in nonagricultural activities for more than 6 months in their 
hometowns.  
Source: NBSC (2010), NBSC (2012), NBSC (2013), and NBSC (2014). 
Table 3: Scale of Outmigrants in Interprovincial Migration 
Province 
1995–2000 2005–2010 
Scale of 
Outmigration 
(10,000) 
Share of Total 
Nation  
(%) 
Scale of 
Outmigration  
(10,000) 
Share of Total 
Nation  
(%) 
Beijing  17.44 0.54  40.60 0.74  
Tianjin  10.43 0.32  21.34 0.39  
Hebei  87.22 2.70  201.74 3.67  
Shanxi 33.36 1.03  79.37 1.44  
Inner Mongolia 44.11 1.37  64.76 1.18  
Liaoning  37.99 1.18  68.54 1.25  
Jilin  52.93 1.64  85.39 1.55  
Heilongjiang  93.98 2.91  146.32 2.66  
Shanghai  16.29 0.50  40.10 0.73  
Jiangsu  124.10 3.84  189.35 3.44  
Zhejiang  96.98 3.00  133.94 2.44  
Anhui  289.30 8.96  552.56 10.05  
Fujian  62.45 1.93  111.37 2.03  
Jiangxi  268.06 8.30  348.33 6.33  
Shandong  87.82 2.72  201.50 3.66  
Henan  230.90 7.15  543.04 9.87  
Hubei  221.02 6.85  380.42 6.92  
Hunan  326.12 10.10  459.19 8.35  
Guangdong  43.80 1.36  161.29 2.93  
Guangxi  183.81 5.69  282.05 5.13  
Hainan  12.96 0.40  23.59 0.43  
Chongqing  110.31 3.42  184.41 3.35  
Sichuan  439.55 13.62  498.81 9.07  
Guizhou  123.19 3.82  268.08 4.87  
Yunnan  39.81 1.23  108.91 1.98  
Xizang  3.54 0.11  6.25 0.11  
Shaanxi  71.93 2.23  134.75 2.45  
Gansu  56.08 1.74  104.69 1.90  
Qinghai  12.32 0.38  15.00 0.27  
Ningxia  8.74 0.27  15.07 0.27  
Xinjiang  21.68 0.67  28.67 0.52  
Total nation 3,228.21 100.00 5,499.39 100.00 
Source: Wang et al. (2012). 
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According to data on interprovincial migration after 1995, provinces with the most 
significant numbers of outmigrants in the middle and western regions have been Anhui, 
Guangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Sichuan. The proportion of outmigrants of 
the total nation’s inter-provincial migrants in each of these provinces exceeds 5%. 
Among them, the proportion of outmigrants of the total nation’s inter-provincial migrants 
in Anhui, Hunan, and Sichuan was around 10% of the national population, and the 
number of outmigrants in these three provinces was 2.89 million (Anhui), 3.26 million 
(Hunan), and 4.49 million (Sichuan) during 1995–2000, increasing to 5.52 million 
(Anhui), 4.59 million (Hunan), and 4.98 million (Sichuan) during 2000–2005. Sichuan 
had the largest number of outmigrants during 1995–2000, while during 2000–2005, 
Anhui had the most.  
3.5.2 Destinations  
In the last 30 years, the most prominent feature of migration is that migrants have 
become more concentrated, flowing into the southeast coastal areas, especially the 
Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta. In the 1980s, migrants were drawn to the 
traditional industrial regions, with the old industrial base in the northeast region 
absorbing 38.14% of total migrants in 1982 (Duan and Yang 2009). After the 1990s, 
the southeast coastal areas absorbed more migrants, while the number of migrants 
flowing to the old industrial base in the northeast declined.  
Guangdong Province absorbed the most migrants in 2005. Migrants to Guangdong 
accounted for 5.23% of total migrants in 1982, rising to 22.37% in 2005. The proportion 
of migrants to the Yangtze River Delta region of Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang rose 
from 11.27% to 20.58% during the same period (Duan and Yang 2009). 
Figure 6: Destination Regions of Migrants, 1982–2010 
(%) 
 
Sources: Data from 1982 to 2005 are from Duan and Yang (2009), and data in 2010 are from Duan, Lv, and Zou (2013). 
For this working paper, the migrant population of the PRC’s 287 prefecture-level cities 
was calculated using data from the 2000 and 2010 population censuses (Xia, Su, and 
Huang 2015). The number of cities with more than 1 million migrants increased from 12 
in 2000 to 41 in 2010. In terms of the spatial distribution of migrants, after 2000, the 
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trend of most migrants agglomerating in the eastern coastal areas, a few provinces, 
and a few cities did not change.10  
As shown in Table 4, the provinces where migrants accounted for the highest 
proportion remain Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang. However, some 
changes in the spatial distribution of migrants in cities did take place between 2000 and 
2010. Shanghai and Beijing—rather than Shenzhen and Dongguan—became the cities 
with the largest numbers of migrants. The scale of migrants in Tianjin and Chongqing 
also increased at a fast pace, while the proportion of the country’s total migrants in the 
southeast coastal cities somewhat declined. The scale of migrants in some large 
western cities and their proportion rose significantly as well.  
Table 4: Scale of Migrant Population in the Top 50 Cities and Proportion 
in the National Migrant Population 
Rank 
2000 2010 
City 
Migrant 
Population 
(10,000)  
Ratio 
(%) City 
Migrant 
Population 
(10,000) 
Ratio 
(%) 
1 Shenzhen 585 7.85 Shanghai  1,102 6.68 
2 Dongguan 492 6.61 Beijing  892 5.41 
3 Shanghai 436 5.85 Shenzhen  828 5.02 
4 Guangzhou 331 4.45 Dongguan  639 3.87 
5 Beijing 260 3.49 Guangzhou  542 3.29 
6 Foshan 221 2.96 Suzhou  452 2.74 
7 Wenzhou 135 1.82 Chengdu  387 2.35 
8 Quanzhou 129 1.74 Tianjin  386 2.34 
9 Chengdu 126 1.69 Foshan  358 2.17 
10 Suzhou 115 1.55 Wenzhou 324 1.96 
11 Kunming 113 1.52 Hangzhou  285 1.73 
12 Zhongshan 104 1.40 Chongqing 280 1.70 
13 Wuhan  98 1.32 Wuhan  277 1.68 
14 Hangzhou 96 1.29 Ningbo  259 1.57 
15 Ningbo  94 1.26 Quanzhou 241 1.46 
16 Huizhou  91 1.23 Nanjing  225 1.36 
17 Chongqing  88 1.19 Wuxi  214 1.30 
18 Wuxi  86 1.15 Zhenzhou 200 1.21 
19 Fuzhou  83 1.12 Xiamen  199 1.21 
20 Nanjing  80 1.07 Xi’an 180 1.09 
21 Tianjing  79 1.06 Qingdao  179 1.09 
22 Xiamen  75 1.00 Fuzhou  176 1.07 
23 Dalian  63 0.85 Shenyang  169 1.02 
24 Zhenzhou  62 0.83 Huizhou  167 1.01 
25 Urumqi 60 0.81 Kunming  167 1.01 
26 Changzhou  60 0.80 Zhongshan  165 1.00 
27 Guiyang  58 0.78 Dalian  165 1.00 
28 Zhuhai  58 0.78 Jinhua  148 0.90 
continued on next page 
10  The authors’ calculation based on NBSC (2001) and NBSC (2011). 
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Table 4 continued 
Rank 
2000 2010 
City 
Migrant 
Population 
(10,000)  
Ratio 
(%) City 
Migrant 
Population 
(10,000) 
Ratio 
(%) 
29 Jinhua  57 0.77 Hefei  148 0.90 
30 Taizhou  55 0.73 Changzhou  143 0.87 
31 Qingdao  54 0.73 Taizhou  143 0.86 
32 Shenyang  52 0.70 Changsha  142 0.86 
33 Changsha  52 0.70 Urumqi 131 0.79 
34 Xi’an 49 0.66 Jiaxing  130 0.79 
35 Harbin 49 0.66 Nanning  128 0.78 
36 Shijiazhuang 47 0.63 Jinan  123 0.74 
37 Jiangmen 46 0.62 Guiyang  118 0.71 
38 Nanning  46 0.62 Harbin 113 0.69 
39 Liuzhou 40 0.54 Taiyuan  110 0.67 
40 Taiyuan 38 0.51 Hohhot 110 0.67 
41 Changchun 36 0.48 Shaoxing  110 0.67 
42 Hohhot  36 0.48 Changchun  97 0.59 
43 Yantai  34 0.46 Nanchang  92 0.56 
44 Hefei  34 0.46 Shijiazhuang 91 0.55 
45 Baotou  33 0.44 Baotou  80 0.48 
46 Shaoxing  33 0.44 Lanzhou  78 0.47 
47 Baoding  33 0.44 Yantai  78 0.47 
48 Nanchang  33 0.44 Jiangmen  76 0.46 
49 Jiaxing  32 0.43 Ordos 76 0.46 
50 Lanzhou 32 0.43 Haikou 74 0.45 
  Total  69.84 Total   72.74 
Note: Migrants refer to migrants moving from other provinces, cities, or towns. 
Sources: NBSC (2001) and NBSC (2011). 
If the leading 50 cities by the scale of migrants are ranked, migrants tended to 
agglomerate in the cities with higher rankings in 2000, while they were more scattered 
across these leading 50 cities in 2010 than in 2000. This is further reflected in the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of these 50 cities’ migrant populations, which decreased 
from 2.27 in 2000 to 1.96 in 2010. 
3.6 Determinants of Migration 
3.6.1 Personal and Family Characteristics 
Education. If the returns on education are higher in industry and services, one can 
infer that education can increase the tendency for labor to migrate from the countryside 
to a city. Early studies found that formal education’s impact on increasing the 
probability of labor migration is insignificant, although it has a positive impact on 
increasing the probability of employment in local nonagricultural industries (Zhao 1997, 
Zhao 1999b). Moreover, Zhao (2003) found that educational level does not have a 
significant impact on labor migration.  
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Nevertheless, many empirical studies have shown that education significantly impacts 
labor migration. Du and Park (2003) found that a high educational level of a household 
does have a positive impact on migration; Zhu (2004) discovered that education only 
has a positive impact on the relocation decisions of males, not females.  
Employing CHIPS 200211 data for this working paper, it was found that, after controlling 
for other individual, household, and village characteristics, different levels of education 
have various positive effects on migrant workers. If illiteracy was used as a reference, 
middle-school education increases the probability that rural labor will work out of their 
hometowns (7.13% more), followed by primary education (5.25%). Compared with 
those who are illiterate, the tendency for individuals with relatively higher educations to 
work out of their hometowns actually shows small increases.12 Of course, this could be 
because rural residents with middle-school educations and above find it easier to 
obtain urban hukous; therefore, they are no longer classified as rural residents who 
“work out of town” (Chen et al. 2014). 
Age. Wang and Liu (2007) found that due to the strong constraints imposed by dual 
institutions, such as the hukou system, on population migration, interprovincial 
migration is, to a large extent, mainly reflected in young laborers working as migrant 
labor and the age distribution being highly concentrated in the aged 20–30 years 
bracket. The impact of age on labor migration is both positive and negative. On the one 
hand, an increase in age brings experience, which enables higher returns to be gained; 
on the other, older migrants have higher psychological costs, and the period in which 
they benefit from migration is short (Zhao 1999b). At the same time, the lack of social 
security and public services that migrant workers face in a city causes bigger problems 
as age increases.  
If these effects are taken into account comprehensively, the impact of age on the 
probability of migration may be an inverted U, first ascending and then descending. 
Studies by Zhu (2002) and Sheng (2008) discovered that age does display an  
inverted-U relationship with the probability of labor migration. Using CHIPS 2002  
data for this working paper, this inverted-U relationship is noticed again. After 
controlling for other factors, 33-year-old labor has the highest probability of migration 
(Chen et al. 2014). 
Gender and marriage. Empirical studies have consistently found that the impact of 
gender and marriage on reallocation decisions is significant. Females and married 
people have higher migration costs, including monetary and psychological. In 
household decision making, males and singles have an obvious comparative 
advantage when it comes to working out of a hometown.  
Zhao (1997) discovered that the migration probability for females is lower than that for 
males by 7%. Zhao (1999b) pointed out that compared with the average level, 37.6% of 
married rural labor is unwilling to reallocate. Similarly, Zhu (2002) discovered that 
marital status has a significant negative impact on labor migration.  
11 CHIPS refers to the Chinese Household and Income Project Survey conducted by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. 
12 The figure for technical schools or higher education schools is 4.75%, while that for high-school 
education is 4.9%. 
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Employing CHIPS 2002 data, this working paper found that the migration probability for 
females is 4.45% lower than that for males, and compared with people of other marital 
status, the migration probability for the married group is 11.76% lower (Chen et al. 
2014). Since the data employed are newer than Zhao (1997, 1999b) and Zhu (2002), it 
can be concluded that the effect of gender and marital status on labor migration is 
declining. This is consistent with the aforementioned trend that the relocation of 
females and entire families in labor migration are generally increasing. 
Land. All else being equal, more laborers and less land per household imply that the 
relationship between population and land is tense, and the probability of labor migration 
will increase. Studies by Zhao (1997, 1999a) and Zhu (2002) found that households 
with more land per capita have a lower probability of labor migration. Du and Park’s 
(2003) study on labor migration of the poor also found that household land per capita 
has a negative impact on migration.  
For this working paper, employing CHIPS 2002 data, it was found that for every extra 
laborer in a household, the individual labor migration probability decreases by 4.01%. 
For every mu 13  increase in household land per capita, the individual tendency to 
migrate decreases by 1.25% (Chen et al. 2014). 
Government policy. Government policy variables affect the relative gain between 
working in agricultural production in one’s hometown and working outside of it, and are 
important parameters that affect labor migration decisions. Zhao (1997, 1999a) showed 
that during one period in the 1990s, the burden of agricultural taxes lowered the real 
income of agricultural production, causing a portion of capable and strong labor to flow 
into nonagricultural industries, affecting agricultural production.  
In recent years, however, the government has emphasized the “three agricultural” 
issues (i.e., agriculture, rural residents, and rural areas) and abolished agriculture  
taxes for the first time in thousands of years, with some grain farmers even receiving 
subsidies. These policy measures conducive to increasing income from agricultural 
production have brought some migrant workers back to farming. Meng (2010) 
discovered that policy adjustments after 2004 indeed reduced the tendency for migrant 
workers to work out of their hometowns, although the strength of the policies is limited. 
Conclusion. Although labor migration is largely the result of household decisions, 
aforementioned factors, such as personal characteristics, household land–person ratio, 
and policy variables, still make their impact felt.  
Differing from orthodox theory that assumes individuals as the decision-making entity, 
new economic migration theory emphasizes the importance of households as decision-
making entities, as households determine the relocation or migration of their members 
in accordance with the principles of maximizing expected income and minimizing risk 
(Stark and Bloom 1985). This theory has three core concepts: 
(i) Risk transfer. Household income is unstable in a hometown, and to hedge risks 
and to diversify income sources, a household will decide to make some of its 
members work out of town or to migrate to reduce the dependence of the 
household on traditional or single-income sources.  
(ii) Economic constraints. Many households face monetary constraints in their 
hometowns, such as not having crop insurance, unemployment insurance, or 
enough credit support. To break through these constraints to development, 
households will decide for some members to work out of a hometown to obtain 
the necessary money and skill.  
13 Mu is a unit of area. 1 mu = 666.7 square meters. 
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(iii) Relative deprivation. When making migration decisions, households not only 
take into account the absolute expected income level but also the income level 
relative to a reference group in a hometown. Even if a household’s income level 
in its hometown sees a large increase, as long as the degree of the increase is 
below that of the reference group, the household will still feel relatively 
deprived, and its tendency to migrate will increase. 
3.6.2 Remittances 
In studies on labor migration in the PRC, the fact that labor migration is the result  
of household decisions is critically reflected in two aspects: diversifying risks and 
remittances. Du (2001) employed agricultural household survey data and discovered 
that after inputting the “1996 household asset value” variable into the determinant 
model of labor’s time supply for nonagricultural work, the coefficient of this variable is 
significantly positive. He believed that the greater the value of household assets, the 
higher the ability to withstand risk, and the higher the time supply for nonagricultural 
work. Since the rural labor market is underdeveloped in poor regions, further labor 
migration is often restricted, making it necessary to reduce welfare losses by effectively 
enhancing marginal labor productivity by cutting down barriers to labor mobility.  
Remittances exhibit the fact that labor migration is the result of household decisions 
even more clearly.14 Li (2001) observed that the proportion of migrant workers remitting 
earnings is higher in the PRC than in other countries and areas, and the ratio of urban 
migrant worker remittances to rural resident household income is rather high as well. 
Du and Park (2003) employed agricultural household survey data on poor countryside 
areas in the western region, and discovered that income transfer of migrant labor is an 
important factor in alleviating poverty. The proportion of relatively poor households that 
transfer income among households with migrant workers is higher than that of rich 
households, which shows that the altruistic nature of migrants has a positive impact on 
alleviating poverty. In fact, Ma et al. (2004) examined the trend  
of population migration and its impact on local labor and rural income growth, and  
their results showed that labor migration has already become a new source of rural 
income growth for undeveloped regions and is increasingly playing the role of 
eliminating poverty and checking regional disparities. In addition, since most rural 
areas do not have medical insurance, many families become poor as a result of 
illnesses, and remittances from migrant workers play a significant role in paying for 
their households’ medical expenses. 
Yet remittances may also have a darker side. The younger generation in rural areas is 
increasingly yearning for a modern way of life, and most remittances are used for day-
to-day consumption expenditures such as weddings and birthday parties similar to 
urban residents, and renovating their homes. To this end, they often undertake 
arduous, dangerous jobs in the cities for a long time. These jobs generally do not have 
labor contracts, and wages are usually settled at the Spring Festival.  
In terms of lifestyle, remittances and the acceptance of such has already become an 
important element of migrant worker and rural household life. In a poor Sichuan 
township in the mid-1990s, the money posted back home by migrant workers every 
year was 5 times greater than that of the town government’s fiscal revenue.  
  
14 Dustmann and Mestres (2010) found that short-term migrants make remittances, which matches the 
PRC’s situation of migrants mostly being short term. 
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It is important also to note that remittances are only a portion of the money migrants 
send back home. Relatively speaking, among those who work out of their hometowns, 
those working in sectors such as transport, communications, and industry send more 
money home, while those working in agriculture send the least home. The closer the 
location of work and residence to a hometown, the greater the amount of money sent 
home; the higher the education level, the larger the remittances (Huang 1997).  
Hu and Qiwen (2007) discovered that the larger the variables of migrant worker 
income, rural hometown nonremittance income, size of rural hometown’s farmland,  
and migrant worker age, the larger the amount of remittances. Migrant workers with 
higher reallocation costs (e.g., transport expenses), their entire family working out of 
the hometown together, unemployment experience, and university education are 
associated with smaller remittances. 
As time passes, remittance behavior changes as well. A recent small-scale survey 
showed that compared with first-generation migrant workers, second-generation 
migrant workers send less money home, and a smaller proportion of them do so. It 
showed that 30.3% of second-generation migrant workers send back CNY100–300 
every month, and 25.8% send CNY301–500, while 25.8% send no money at all or their 
family members back home do not need them to send money back. In such cases, 
their income is entirely disposable (Liu and Cheng 2008). 
3.6.3 Destination Characteristics 
Before 2005, the scale of economies was an important factor for a place to attract 
migrant labor (Wang 1996). Xiao and Liu (2007) found that regions that had a bigger 
nonagriculture industry, had higher expected earnings, and were at a shorter distance 
to the migrants’ hometowns were more likely to be chosen by migrants. Duan (2001) 
found that provinces that had higher fixed-asset investment absorbed more migrants, 
and Zhu and Zeng (2004) found that provinces with a mainly export-oriented economy 
absorbed more migrants.  
However, in 2010, there were some new changes to the PRC’s migrant destinations. 
The level of economic development has a positive impact on the number of a city’s 
migrants, but the degree of influence declined between 2000 and 2010. Fixed-asset 
investment and foreign direct investment had significant positive effects in attracting 
migrants in 2000; however, this effect disappears in 2010. Between 2000 and 2010,  
the tertiary (service) sector replaced the secondary (manufacturing and construction) 
sector to be the main force that attracts migrants to cities. Further, the floating 
population has increased with the expansion of the city population size, but the speed 
at which the city population size increased descended in 2000 and then ascended in 
2010 (Xia, Su, and Huang 2015 ). 
Along with the factors already discussed, people also migrate for public services  
and human capital externalities (Xia and Lu 2015). Using the micro data of the 1% 
population census in 2005 and characteristics of 220 prefecture-level cities, the 
influence of city characteristics, including public services and wages, on labor flow was 
studied. It was found that people tend to migrate to a city where they can demand 
higher wages and job opportunities and better basic education and medical services 
(although in inflow cities, migrants cannot enjoy the same public services as local 
residents because of the constraints of the hukou system). Migrants are also more 
likely to flow to cities with higher average educational years of the population and larger 
populations. This means cross-regional equalization of public services can mitigate,  
but not stop, agglomeration in large cities. The regression results are presented in  
the Appendix. 
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3.7 Migration and Natural Growth of Population 
Figure 7 presents the growth trend of the urbanization rate and natural growth rate of 
the population in the PRC. In a region, the increased population comes from two 
sources: natural growing population and migrants. In the PRC, the natural growth rate 
of population in urban areas is usually lower than that in rural areas. Thus, when the 
natural growth rate of the national population declined after the 1970s, the natural 
growth rate of population in urban areas had a bigger decline. However, after 1970, 
and especially after 1995, the urbanization rate rose rapidly, which can be attributed to 
rural–urban migrants.  
Figure 7: Urbanization Ratio and Natural Growth Rate of Population since 1949 
 
Note: The urban population ratio is the urban population at the end of year to the total population at the end of year. 
Source: NBSC, http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01 
4. URBANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
4.1 Employment Growth in Urban Areas 
After the reforms and opening up, the number of those employed increased rapidly 
from 401.52 million in 1978 to 767.00 million in 2012. Significant changes took place  
in the employment structure of the three main sectors. As shown in Figure 9, the 
proportion of employment in the primary sector declined from 71% in 1978 to 34% in 
2012. Labor in the secondary and tertiary sectors, however, has expanded rapidly 
since 1978. The increasing speed of employment in the tertiary sector has been much 
faster than that in the secondary sector, first surpassing it in 1995 and then exceeding 
that in the primary sector in 2011. In 2012, the tertiary sector became the largest 
absorbing employment.  
According to Figure 8 and Figure 9, the proportion of employment and the proportion of 
GDP in the primary sector have the same declining trends. The rapid development of 
the secondary and tertiary sector helps absorb large quantities of the rural surplus 
labor force.  
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Figure 8: Proportion of Employment in the Three Main Sectors since 1978 
(%) 
 
Source: NBSC, http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01 
Figure 9: Proportion of Gross Domestic Product in the Three Main Sectors  
since 1978 
(%) 
 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
Source: NBSC, http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01 
4.2 Urbanization and Employment Structure of Migrants 
Although employment in the tertiary sector surpassed that in the secondary sector  
in 1995, migrants are still mainly working in the secondary sector (Table 5). The  
two largest industries within the secondary sector in which migrants work are 
manufacturing and construction. The proportion of migrants working in manufacturing 
was above 30% before 2008, but then this proportion started declining. Construction  
is the second-biggest industry in which migrant workers are engaged, and the 
proportion of migrants in construction took a big leap from 13.8% in 2008 to 22.2% in  
2010, perhaps as a result of the massive investment in infrastructure after the  
stimulus package.  
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The proportion of migrants working in services has changed little in the last 6 years, 
staying around 34%. A remarkable change is that in 2013 services surpassed 
manufacturing and became the largest industry to absorb migrants. This is consistent 
with this working paper, which found that cities with a higher ratio of secondary 
industrial output compared with tertiary industrial output had a stronger ability to absorb 
migrants in 2000; however, cities with a higher ratio of tertiary industrial output 
compared with secondary industrial output had a stronger ability to absorb migrants in 
2010 (Xia, Su, and Huang 2015 ).  
The employment structure of migrants varies across different regions. In the eastern 
region, migrants mainly work in manufacturing, followed by services and construction. 
In the middle and western regions, migrants work mainly in services and least in 
manufacturing. The proportion of migrants working in construction is largest in the 
western region, and smallest in the eastern region. There is a similar pattern in the 
proportion of migrants working in services. Differences in the employment structures of 
migrants are probably caused by most infrastructure investment being concentrated in 
the middle and western regions as a result of the stimulus package. 
Table 5: Industry Distribution of Rural–Urban Migrant Workers 
(%) 
Industry 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Manufacturing 37.2 36.1 36.7 36.0 35.7 31.4 
Construction 13.8 15.2 16.1 17.7 18.4 22.2 
Services 33.1 35.5 35.6 34.2 33.8 34.1 
Transport, storage, and post  6.4 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.6 6.3 
Wholesale and retail trade 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.1 9.8 11.3 
Accommodations and catering  5.5 6.0 6.0 5.3 5.2 5.9 
Resident and other services 12.2 12.7 12.7 12.2 12.2 10.6 
Other industries 15.9 13.2 11.6 12.1 12.1 12.3 
Source: NBSC’s Annual Report of Monitoring Survey on National Rural–urban Migrant Workers (NBSC, 2010–2014). 
Table 6: Industry Distribution of Rural–Urban Migrant Workers  
(%) 
Industry 
2011 2012 2013 
Eastern Middle Western Eastern Middle Western Eastern Middle Western 
Manufacturing 44.8 23.0 15.4 44.6 23.2 15.4 43.1 20.1 13.2 
Construction 13.4 24.7 27.4 13.9 25.5 28.4 17.5 28.5 30.0 
Services 31.0 38.5 41.3 30.9 37.9 40.4 30.4 37.5 41.7 
Transport, storage, 
and post 
5.5 8.1 9.3 5.6 8.2 8.8 5.3 7.3 8.2 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
8.7 13.1 12.5 8.5 12.6 11.9 10.2 12.9 13.2 
Accommodations 
and catering  
4.5 5.9 7.3 4.4 5.8 7.6 5.0 6.2 8.1 
Resident and other 
services 
12.3 11.4 12.2 12.4 11.3 12.1 9.9 11.1 12.2 
Other industries 10.8 13.8 15.9 10.6 13.4 15.8 9.0 13.9 15.1 
Source: NBSC’s Annual Report of Monitoring Survey on National Rural–urban Migrant Workers (NBSC, 2010–2014). 
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4.3 Urbanization and Informalization 
4.3.1 Wages  
After 2008, the wages of migrants increased rapidly. Monthly earnings almost doubled 
during 2008–2013, from CNY1,340 to CNY2,609. The earnings of migrants exhibited 
no significant difference across regions; thus, it is difficult to discern why people still 
migrate to the eastern region even if earnings do not differ much. Similar earnings may 
just be the result of labor mobility across regions, and the probability of getting a job is 
higher in the eastern region. Further, labor migrates for other amenities, such as public 
services or externalities of human capital, as already discussed.  
Table 7: Monthly Earnings of Rural–Urban Migrant Workers  
(CNY) 
Region 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Nation 1,340 1,417 1,690 2,049 2,290 2,609 
Eastern 1,352 1,422 1,696 2,053 2,286 n.a. 
Middle 1,275 1,350 1,632 2,006 2,257 n.a. 
Western 1,273 1,378 1,643 1,990 2,226 n.a. 
n.a. = not available. 
Source: NBSC’s Annual Report of Monitoring Survey on National Rural–urban Migrant Workers (NBSC, 2010–2014). 
4.3.2 Social Security  
In the PRC, a clear definition of informal employment does not exist. However, whether 
a worker is covered by social security is an important characteristic of the 
informalization and instability of jobs. In the last 6 years, migrant participation in every 
type of social security has increased significantly, although the level of participation is 
still very low (Table 8). Among the five types of social insurance, the participation rate 
in occupational injury insurance is the highest, while the participation rate in health care 
insurance and pension insurance rank second and third. The lowest participation is in 
birth insurance. 
Table 8: Participation Rate in Social Security of Rural–Urban Migrants  
(%) 
Insurance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pension insurance 9.8 7.6 9.5 13.9 14.3 15.7 
Occupational injury insurance  24.1 21.8 24.1 23.6 24.0 28.5 
Health care insurance 13.1 12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 17.6 
Unemployment insurance 3.7 3.9 4.9 8.0 8.4 9.1 
Birth insurance 2.0 2.4 2.9 5.6 6.1 6.6 
Source: NBSC’s Annual Report of Monitoring Survey on National Rural–urban Migrant Workers (NBSC, 2010–2014). 
4.3.3 Self-Employment  
Self-employment constitutes a major portion of informal jobs. According to the national 
monitoring survey on rural–urban migrant workers in 2013, 83.5% of migrant workers 
were employed, and 16.5% were self-employed. Among employed migrant workers, 
61.4% were working in manufacturing and construction. Among self-employed migrant 
workers, 76.3% were working in services. 
  
23 
 
ADBI Working Paper 593 Lu and Xia 
 
Table 9: Distribution of Employed and Self-Employed Migrants, 2013 
Industry Employed  Self-Employed 
Manufacturing 35.8 10.7 
Construction 25.6 5.9 
Services 25.3 76.3 
  Transport, storage, and post 5.5 39.6 
  Wholesale and retail trade 4.5 15.1 
  Accommodations and catering  5.3 8.5 
  Resident and other services 10.0 13.1 
Other industries 13.3 7.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: NBSC (2014). 
4.3.4 Occupational Mobility  
In cities, most migrant workers work in the secondary sector in jobs with low wages, 
long working hours, poor working environments, and low occupational status (Li 2006). 
Most migrants work as unskilled workers in manufacturing, services providers in sales 
and trade, and construction (Li 1999; Fu, Tang, and Jiang 2012).  
Migrant workers change jobs frequently. In investigating 728 migrants in Beijing, Bai 
and Li (2008) found that 63.25% changed jobs, and the average number of changes 
was 2.06 after working outside of their hometowns. Accordingly, Zhang (2010) found 
that the mobility rate of migrants (42.3%) greatly exceeds that of urban residents 
(19.9%). Using an urban household survey for 1999, Knight and Yueh (2004) found 
that urban residents have the longest average tenure in a job at 19.9 years, while 
migrants have the shortest at 4.5 years.  
Although migrants change jobs frequently, their earnings have not improved 
significantly, and some migrants even suffer income decline after job changes (Bai and 
Li 2008). Their occupational status change is insignificant (Li 1999), and they face 
significant obstacles in moving to occupations with a higher social status (Fu, Tang, 
and Jiang 2012). Due to limited possibilities of upward mobility, most migrants want to 
be self-employed and own private enterprises in the future (Xia unpublished). 
4.3.5 Living Conditions  
Renting houses is common for migrants (Table 10). Half of such migrants shares a 
rented accommodation with others, while the other half rents houses independently. 
The second form of accommodation is dormitories of employer units; the proportion of 
migrants in these was 28.6% in 2013. In Table 10, the data show that fewer migrants 
purchase houses in their working areas.   
The living conditions of migrants vary according to the size of a city. In large cities, the 
proportions of migrant workers living in dormitories, sheds, and rented houses are 
higher than those in small cities or towns. The proportion of migrant workers living at 
home and working outside is very high in small towns.  
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Table 10: Accommodation Distribution of Migrant Workers, 2013  
(%) 
Accommodation National  
Municipality or 
Provincial Capital City 
Prefecture 
City 
Small 
Town 
Dormitories 28.6 30.4 33.0 23.0 
Sheds at construction sites 11.9 14.9 10.9 10.4 
Work sites 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.6 
Rent houses with others 18.5 21.6 20.5 13.9 
Rent houses alone 18.2 20.4 19.9 14.9 
Purchase houses at work sites 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.2 
Live at home, work outside 13.0 3.2 6.4 27.3 
Other 3.1 3.0 2.7 3.8 
Source: NBSC (2014). 
4.4 City Scale and Job Creation 
The relationship between city scale and employment probability is an important topic  
in urban economics. If increases in city population raise one’s employment  
probability, unemployment is not a major concern in urban population expansion. Using 
individual-level data from CHIPS 2002 and 2007, Gao, Lu, and Sato (2015) estimated 
probit models of employment determination. Instrumental variable regression results 
showed that it is more likely for individuals to be employed in big cities. Every  
1% growth in a city’s scale increases one’s employment probability by 0.039–0.041 
percentage points. Besides, there is a scale advantage of big cities being 
heterogeneous among individuals with different human capital.  
Both the most and least educated workers benefit from city scale, with the least skilled 
workers benefiting the most. However, employment prospects of medium-skilled 
workers are not affected. Therefore, restricting urban population growth, especially the 
migration of low-skilled workers, will harm both efficiency and equity, and thus 
undermine inclusive urban growth (Gao, Lu, and Sato 2015). 
Gao (2014) estimated the effect of city scale on income using individual-level data from 
the 2002 and 2007 Chinese Household Income Project surveys. Every 1% increase in 
a city’s population leads to approximately 0.189%–0.190% increase in one’s nominal 
income. Even when cities’ price differences were considered, city expansion still raises 
individual incomes. Gao used two different price indexes to deflate nominal income, 
and found that when city population grows by 1%, individuals’ real incomes rise by 
0.082%–0.143%.  
5. URBAN SEGMENTATION AND MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
5.1 Labor Market Segmentation 
Another manifestation of dual society segmentation in cities is the various 
segmentations or discrimination seen in the labor market. As Knight and Yueh (2004) 
pointed out, job stability is worse for nonlocal people than urban locals, and their job 
turnover is approximately six times that of urban locals. Even if only the urban locals 
who entered the labor market after the iron rice bowl system was smashed are  
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taken into consideration, job turnover for nonlocals is still twice that of urban locals.  
Knight and Yueh also discovered that compared with urban locals, job changes for 
nonlocals are more voluntary. Moreover, education and job experience both increase 
job turnover, as an increase in human capital indeed provides more employment 
opportunities for nonlocals (Knight and Yueh 2004).  
However, it is difficult to view the higher proportion of voluntary job changes for 
nonlocals as evidence of any advantage that they hold in the labor market. One 
explanation for this finding is that urban locals do not want to give up a job with which 
they are satisfied unless enterprise reforms cause them to face unemployment. A  
study by Zhang (2010) on the job turnover of Beijing, Wuxi, and Zhuhai found that 
institutional discrimination reduces the job options of nonlocals, increasing their costs 
of job hunting and unemployment. Further, compared with urban locals and the mobile 
population who have been long-term urban residents, temporary migrants tend to work 
longer in a firm and experience shorter unemployment. This should not be viewed as 
evidence of any advantage enjoyed by temporary urban residents, as nonlocals who 
have just arrived in an unfamiliar environment must accept work even if the working 
conditions are bad. Indeed, Zhang (2010) found that nonlocals switch jobs more once 
they have accumulated enough assets. 
Of course, migrant workers from rural areas are at a disadvantage even before 
entering the urban labor market. In Démurger et al.’s (2009) decomposition of the 
annual income disparity between urban residents and nonlocals who have been 
employed in a city for a long period shows that the population effect before entering the 
labor market is the most important and robust factor in explaining the income disparity 
between the two groups. Although they argued that the source of urban–rural worker 
income gaps is mainly due to disparities in aspects such as educational opportunities 
before entering the labor market, it cannot be denied that such human resources 
endowment disparity before entering the labor market is also a result of urban–rural 
segmentation, discussed in more detail in the next section. 
More studies have stressed the discrimination that nonlocal workers face in the cities. 
For example, Cai, Du, and Wang (2003b) discovered that discrimination in the labor 
market is caused by differences in urban and rural identities. Specifically, in the income 
disparity between rural migrant labor and urban local labor, only 24% is explained  
by the variation in personal characteristics and the remaining 76% is explained by 
discrimination. This implies that under the current system, increasing migrant workers’ 
level of education cannot fully eliminate the income disparity between rural migrants 
and urban residents.  
However, due to the existence of segmentation in the labor market, the gap between 
labor with local hukous and labor without local hukous may continue to expand. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, during the next 10 years when rural labor began to work in 
cities on a massive scale, wages for migrant workers in a few relatively developed 
regions did not change, but within cities, from 1994 to 2004, the average urban 
employee’s real average salary rose from CNY4,538 to CNY11,902 (1994 prices).15 
Meng and Bai (2007) employed payroll data from seven Guangdong enterprises 
between 2000 and 2004 and found that the gap between the wage for migrant workers 
and Guangdong’s average employee wage kept increasing, and during this period, 
migrant workers’ wages did not see a significant gain.  
 
15 Data are from NBSC (2005). 
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Similarly, Yan (2007) employed data from four major surveys in Shanghai to discover 
that during 1995 and 2003, the pace at which the rate of return on human capital 
increased differed for nonlocal labor and local residents, and the gap between the two 
paces is likely to continue to increase. Zhang and Meng (2007) compared data from 
1999 and 2002, showing that the income gap between rural migrant workers and urban 
residents is increasing and that this is mainly caused by the relative decline in the 
educational return of migrant workers.  
These studies all illustrate that the increased income gap between workers with 
different hukou identities within a city is not just due to the gap in human capital. It is 
also, to a certain extent, related to the increase in the gap between returns on human 
capital. Cai and Du (2011) argued that there is some evidence indicating wage 
convergence between local and migrant workers based on a comparison between the 
wage growth rage of local and migrant workers. However, as Figure 2 in their paper 
shows, only migrant workers at the bottom of wage distribution have experienced faster 
wage growth, while migrant workers at the top of wage distribution have much lower 
wage growth than local workers. This could be the result of pro-agriculture policies, 
which increased the reservation wage of low-income migrant workers, rather than the 
evidence of wage convergence.  
Other than income gaps and gaps between the returns on human capital, dual 
segmentation exists in professions, jobs, and industries in the urban labor market. 
Labor market segmentation abroad is often related to factors such as sex, race, and 
union membership (Ashenfelter 1997; Altonji and Blank 1999), while dual segmentation 
in the PRC labor market is connected to hukou. Meng and Zhang (2001) found that 
significant disparities in professional status and income levels exist between nonlocals 
and urban residents, and these disparities mostly cannot be explained by the 
differences in productivity of the two types of labor.  
Moreover, employing data from the fifth population census as well as survey data  
from five cities, Wang (2005) classified jobs for urban residents and nonlocals into  
five categories: self-employed, public sector worker, public sector administrative and 
technical personnel, nonpublic sector worker, and nonpublic sector administrative and 
technical personnel. The results showed that of the income gap between nonlocal labor 
and urban local labor, 59% is caused by the income disparity between different jobs, 
and 41% is caused by the income disparity within the type of job. However, 43% of 
income disparity is caused by unexplainable factors such as discrimination, reflecting 
that nonlocals enter into jobs that are relatively low paid. 
5.2 Social Segmentation 
Due to the dual society segmentation within cities, establishing new urban–rural 
integrated social networks for migrant workers can be difficult, and this may even result 
in mutual distrust between urban and rural residents. Generally, migrant workers  
use kinship or geographical connections to choose their destination and to obtain 
information regarding employment. Such a social network formed in the countryside is 
brought to the city, and the individual ability of migrant workers to withstand risk is 
increased through mutual help.  
However, the existence of the hukou system often prevents social organizations, social 
activities, and social services of urban communities from sufficiently serving migrant 
workers. Trade unions do not cover migrant workers, either. This causes the urban 
social capital of migrant workers to be limited to the migrant worker community, and no 
integration between urban residents and migrant workers is generated in terms of 
social capital.  
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The dual society segmentation in cities also fosters distrust among migrant workers 
toward urban residents and municipal governments, increasing the difficulty of 
implementing and administering public policies, creating immense social losses. Wang, 
Chen, and Lu (2009) analyzed the determinants of resident trust based on survey data 
from Shanghai with an emphasis on the impact of hukou identity. The study found that, 
all other conditions being equal, residents without a local hukou are more distrustful  
of their neighbors in the community and most people, and their trust in the government 
is even lower. Moreover, hukou segmentation’s negative impact on trust levels do  
not decline or disappear with the nonlocal hukou residents’ increase in income or 
educational level. That is to say, enabling nonlocals with relatively higher educational 
levels and technical skills to work in cities is unlikely to resolve the problem of social 
discord. Even if nonlocals have higher incomes than local residents, if they are not 
given the same treatment as urban residents, they will still have a significantly lower 
trust level than urban locals with the same characteristics. 
Moreover, studies on individual satisfaction found that nonlocal hukou has a significant 
negative impact on individual satisfaction (Chen, Xu, and Liu 2011; He and Pan 2010). 
The dissatisfaction of the nonurban hukou population mainly comes from income  
and education gaps between people with different hukou identities. The income gap 
between people with different hukou identities also has a negative impact on the 
satisfaction of urban residents with an advantaged status. The explanation is that if 
identity-induced income gaps lead to problems such as conflict or crime, it will generate 
negative impacts on urban hukou residents as well (Jiang, Lu, and Sato 2012). 
5.3 Residential Segregation 
In terms of residential space, the dual society segmentation in cities is strongly 
reflected in the existence of “urban villages.” The urban village itself is a product of the 
urban–rural segmentation system. Due to the difference between land institutions in the 
countryside and the city, when rapid urbanization produces large amounts of urban 
land through changing land usage from agricultural to nonagricultural, such land begins 
to surround what used to be villages. While urban villages have become “urban,” they 
are still under the management of their former rural collective land institutions. Dirty 
and messy urban villages with densely packed, although cheap, housing naturally 
become the residential areas of low-income migrant workers. Thus, residential 
segregation between people with or without local urban hukou is strikingly evident.  
Even without urban villages, residential segregation of people with different hukous in 
cities still exists. Since most migrant workers belong to the low-income group in cities, 
their residential location is often clustered in the margins of the urban area. These are 
often low-cost communities where the environment is poor and the density of buildings 
high. In time, residential segregation within a city will naturally intensify. Under such 
residential segregation, in low-income communities, the interaction between residents 
can cause various social problems such as unemployment, poverty, and crime, 
generating great difficulties for the city’s administration.  
Such residential segregation has economic and sociopsychological reasons as well. 
The high price of housing and services in high-class communities has a squeezing 
effect on low-income individuals, which means the average person cannot enter this 
market. Among the various amenities surrounding high-class communities, the most 
important are quality and expensive schools, hospitals, and public security, and only 
high-income individuals can bear the corresponding costs. Residence in high-class 
communities also gives people a superior feeling and usually results in more favorable 
social networks. In fact, even developed countries have faced the negative effects of 
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residential segregation during economic development. In the PRC, the higher the 
position of a community, the more a developer tends to choose locations where the 
environment is good, and high-income individuals cluster there. Meanwhile, the high 
price of housing forces low-income individuals to migrate toward the margins of the 
urban area, creating residential segregation. In Shanghai, empirical analysis has 
shown that significant residential segregation exists between people with and without 
local hukou (Chen, Lu, and Chen 2012; Chen and Hao 2014). 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Rapid urbanization in the PRC has resulted from recent decades of intense rural–urban 
migration. Based on various empirical studies on the determinants of migration, 
migration is not only a personal decision but also a joint decision within households to 
send members with comparative advantages in manufacturing and services, usually 
male and young, to work in cities. Coastal regions where manufacturing and services 
are better developed, especially big cities, are the major destinations. The aspiration 
for higher-income and better job opportunities is the major force that drives migration, 
while public services and urban amenities also partly account for population flows. 
However, in the PRC, there are still major institutional barriers—especially the hukou 
system and related segmentation in the urban labor market, social security, and public 
services access—that hinder rural–urban and interregional migration. Facing the 
challenges of fast urbanization, and growing urban diseases, local governments still 
rely on the current system to control the population flow into large cities, especially 
megacities. Contrary the view of the government that migration has generated social 
problems in cities, the problems are largely a result of the current discriminative 
policies rather than urban population growth itself.  
As other chapters argue, even if urban population growth is partly the cause of urban 
diseases, technological progress and management need to be improved to deal with 
these diseases. Controlling population growth by discriminative policies will only lead to 
more social problems, as existing studies have shown. Policy makers should be fully 
aware of the negative effects of current policies against market forces, which is leading 
to both inefficiency and unfairness. It is time to reconsider the way to achieve efficient 
and harmonious urbanization by shifting to more pro-market policies and reducing the 
migration costs embedded in institutional constraints. 
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APPENDIX: EFFECTS OF CITY CHARACTERISTICS  
ON LABOR MIGRATION 
City Characteristics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Model 4 
(standardized) 
Basic education 0.414*** 
(0.00748) 
0.237*** 
(0.00843) 
0.110*** 
(0.00955) 
0.116*** 
(0.0101) 
Medical services 0.362*** 
(0.00135) 
0.0131*** 
(0.00389) 
0.0820*** 
(0.00901) 
0.118*** 
(0.0130) 
Wage  0.000105*** 
(0.00000157) 
0.0000335*** 
(0.00000193) 
0.151*** 
(0.00866) 
Unemployment rate  –7.181*** 
(0.200) 
–2.687*** 
(0.207) 
–0.137*** 
(0.0105) 
Fixed-asset investment 
ratio 
 –0.540*** 
(0.0524) 
1.137*** 
(0.0617) 
0.156*** 
(0.00850) 
Industrial structure  –0.742*** 
(0.0239) 
–1.746*** 
(0.0330) 
–0.514*** 
(0.00972) 
Distance to nearest 
seaport 
 –0.0018*** 
(0.0000643) 
–0.00411*** 
(0.0000709) 
–1.630*** 
(0.0281) 
Distance to regional 
large city 
 –0.00234*** 
(0.0000759) 
–0.000866*** 
(0.0000764) 
–0.207*** 
(0.0182) 
Scale of population   0.00295*** 
(0.0000422) 
0.885*** 
(0.0127) 
Average educational 
years 
  0.629*** 
(0.0158) 
0.474*** 
(0.0119) 
House price   0.0000815*** 
(0.0000135) 
0.0703*** 
(0.0117) 
Distance to hukou city   –0.407*** 
(0.0240) 
–1.343*** 
(0.00731) 
Outside province   –0.00225*** 
(0.0000123) 
–1.435*** 
(0.0156) 
Capital of province  
(yes = 1) 
  –1.435*** 
(0.0156) 
–0.407*** 
(0.0240) 
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2  358,831.4 370,373.1 465,278.7 465,278.7 
Pseudo R2  0.3288 0.3393 0.4263 0.4263 
Observations 22,260,260 22,260,260 22,260,260 22,260,260 
Number of cities 220 220 220 220 
Number of individuals 101,183 101,183 101,183 101,183 
Notes: 
1.  ***, **, and * represent coefficients significant at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
2.  Basic education refers to primary school teachers per student and middle school teachers per student. Medical 
services refer to hospitals per capita, hospital beds per capita, and doctors per capita. These two variables are 
constructed using a principal component analysis.  
3.  Fixed-asset investment ratio refers to the ratio of the value of fixed-asset investment to gross domestic product.  
4.  Industry structure refers to the ratio of the production value of the tertiary sector to that of the secondary sector.  
5.  Distance to nearest seaport means a city’s nearest distance to Hong Kong, China; Shanghai; or Tianjin—the major 
seaports in the People’s Republic of China.  
6.  Distance to a regional large city measures a city’s distance to the nearest regional large city among the 14 cities that 
had a population of more than 4 million permanent residents.  
7.  Distance to hukou city refers to the distance of the destination city from the city in which the migrant holds hukou.  
8.  Outside province means that the destination city does not belong to the migrant’s original province.  
9.  The estimation method is the conditional logit model. Model 4 is based on standardized data using the standard 
deviation of each variable. 
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